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The Business Lawyer
THE EXPANDING RISKS OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
By
REED DICKERSON*
Bloomington, Indiana
In 1951, when I stepped out of the products liability scene, I
thought the subject had been pretty well talked out. But -last year
I returned to find the talk more vociferous than ever. How come?
Why is the risk of products liability apparently expanding?
One reason is the steady increase in the number and complexity
of new products like household insecticides and foods containing new
additives, not all of which have been fully tested before being put on
the market. Not only is there more to go wrong today, but the con-
sumer's relative helplessness in the face of hidden defects is increasing.
A products liability expert stated at a Dallas symposium two weeks
ago that in his opinion an equally important factor has been the do-it-
yourself craze. Theoretically, the ineptitude of the user does not
imply inadequacies in the product itself, however much it may increase
the seller's responsibility to educate the consumer through labelling
and instructions. Practically, however, the result may be otherwise.
If a consumer is blinded by a disintegrating grinding wheel, the de-
fendant manufacturer may find it hard to convince the jury that, in-
stead of a defect in the product itself, the real cause of the accident
was improper alignment of the wheel or use of too much pressure.
Moreover, in recent years there have been marked increases in the
size of personal injury recoveries. The Research Institute of Amer-
ica recently listed 17 examples of such recoveries, all but two of which
were in five or six figures. Some of these may have been due to in-
creased prejudice of juries against large corporations, but many can
be attributed to the increased sophistication of plaintiffs' counsel.
Twenty years ago, the typical plaintiff's lawyer, in contrast to defend-
ants' counsel, dealt with products liability only sporadically. Today,
some plaintiffs' lawyers specialize in products liability and even the
novice has the benefit of legal services such as NACCA's Product
Liability Exchange.
Still another factor has been the marked general increase in claims
consciousness. Some of this is undoubtedly due to the notoriety given
to the large personal injury judgments that have been granted in
recent years.
Another important factor has been several shifts in legal doctrine.
Undoubtedly, the most important example is the continued wearing
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away of the so-called "privity" requirement. In case some of you are
familiar with only insurance or medical gobbledygook, let me explain
that the privity requirement says that consumer Smith can't sue
manufacturer Rogers for breach of a contract (including breach of
a warranty) unless the deal was between those two people. In other
words, a consumer who has been hurt by a defective product can't
sue the manufacturer if he bought it from a retailer.
At one time, the consumer couldn't sue the manufacturer even if
the manufacturer had been downright careless. But ever since the
case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E.
1050 (1916), the privity requirement has been pretty much a dead
letter in negligence suits. Unfortunately, this has been an empty
victory for the consumer in many of the cases in which he has been
unable to show actual negligence. Although many courts have
fudged by allowing the jury to infer negligence merely from the fact
that the consumer has traced the defect to the defendant's plant, the
"negligence" approach has been so uncertain that consumers would
much prefer to sue for breach of warranty. An increasing number of
courts is agreeing with them.
The hole in the privity dike first appeared in the food cases, where
some wit has remarked, "In matters alimentary, recovery is ele-
mentary." This hole is now represented by about 15 states and there
is every indication that it will get larger. A similar development has
begun for drugs and cosmetics, although the erosion of the privity
requirement in those areas has not gone so far.
What about other products? For them, the first crack in the dike
occurred in 1932, when a Mr. Sam Baxter successfully sued the
Ford Motor Company for loss of an eye on the basis of false state-
ments in Ford pamphlets asserting the shatterproof quality of its
windshields (Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. 2d
409 (1932). A recent case along the same lines was Rogers v. Toni
Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N. E. 2d 612 (1958),
an Ohio case in which the plaintiff recovered on the basis of express
representations in the manufacturer's advertisements and labels. Both
cases were important because in enforcing express warranties they
made clear that in today's marketing scheme the consumer and the
manufacturer are not so remote from each other as the intervention
of a couple of distributors might seem to indicate.
The trouble with these two cases is that, being limited to the
enforcement of express warranties, they are of little help in cases not
involving definite representations or promises. This is particularly
true for food. In fact, I know of only one reported food case in
which the plaintiff consumer was able to find an express representa-
tion specific enough to enforce (Lane v. C. A. Swanson & Sons, 130
Cal. App. 2d 210, 278 P. 2d 725 (1955).
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Instead of looking for express warranties, some courts have begun
to see that, whether or not they constitute express warranties, manu-
facturers' advertising appeals today are aimed primarily at the con-
sumer, over the heads of any intervening distributors. This either
makes the privity requirement a meaningless anachronism or allows
you to argue, with good logic, that even if there is still a privity re-
quirement the manufacturer and the consumer comply with it because
in effect they deal face to face.
This philosophy is beginning to take hold even in fields far removed
from food, drugs, and cosmetics. Of the roughly half-dozen cases
that illustrate this trend, probably the most important is Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 161 A. 2d 69 (1960), decided only last
May by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Here a husband and wife
were badly injured through failure of the steering equipment on their
new Plymouth, and they were allowed to recover even as against the
manufacturer, with whom neither had dealt. The court's main ground
for dispensing with the privity requirement was that such a require-
ment makes no sense in today's merchandising pattern.
There have also been inroads on the privity requirement from
legislative sources. The six states that have enacted the Uniform
Commercial Code have expressly done away with it in suits against
the retailer brought by guests or members of the buyer's household
(section 2-216), and they have omitted from the Code any language,
such as that appearing in section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act, that
might prevent a court from overthrowing the requirement on its own
initiative.
In 1958 Georgia went even farther by enacting a statute that creates
in each sale of new goods a manufacturer's warranty of merchanta-
bility that extends directly to the consumer (Ga. Code Ann. § 96-307).
From all this it would seem that, although the privity requirement
is far from dead, its ultimate demise in most states is only a matter
of time.
On one basis or another, removal of this requirement in warranty
cases exposes the manufacturer to strict liability; that is, it makes
him liable even though he has not been careless. This increases the
manufacturer's vulnerability to successful claims. The increase is
not as great as it might seem, because many past recoveries in so-
called "negligence" suits have rested on little more than a showing of
causation, which is in effect strict liability.
The argument for strict liability is not merely that it simplifies the
proof of actual cases. It also imposes on the manufacturer a whole-
some incentive to improve his product by testing it further or by
adopting other precautions designed to intercept defects.
Of greater interest to this audience is the point that strict liability
makes possible a sharing of the risk or loss among consumers gen-
erally. So far as the manufacturer is induced by civil liability to
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improve his product and reflect in his prices the costs of improve-
ment, he can be said to be "spreading the risk." So far as such
improvements are unsuccessful and he is induced to reflect in his
prices the costs of paying injury claims, he can be said to be "spread-
ing the loss." Together, these price increases provide a kind of in-
dustry-wide "do it yourself" insurance.
In such a de facto insurance policy the consumer is the immediate
beneficiary. From his standpoint, the device seems to be working
reasonably well.
The significant question is, How well if is working for the seller,
whom the law has made an insurer? If he has a large operation, a
fairly predictable claim rate, and a sizeable financial cushion, he can
without undue strain handle his losses out of a reserve for claims. He
can even withstand and amortize an occasional blockbuster.
On the other hand, if he has a small operation, low volume, a
sporadic claim rate, and particularly a thin financial cushion, he is
like an insurance company that needs reinsurance. This theoretically
puts him in the market for a product liability policy, which will make
it possible to continue this de facto consumer insurance without ex-
posing him to the risk of being financially crippled by a large judg-
ment. Ironically, however, if he is small enough, like the independent
corner grocer, he may be financially so unattractive that he needs no
protection at all.
If he is in an intermediate position where he has a generally fore-
seeable claim rate that he can handle out of a modest reserve for
claims but is vulnerable to a very large judgment, his best bet is a
policy with a fairly high deductible.
With personal injury judgments greatly increasing in size, more
and more companies are finding it desirable to buy product liability
insurance. The September 1960 issue of the Journal of American
Insurance estimates that 70 to 80 percent of all firms now carry this
kind of protection. These figures seem much too high for sellers
generally but they are probably fairly accurate for large, well-heeled
manufacturers.
Is there any flaw in this apparently happy picture? What about
the seller's ability to absorb or pass on to the consumer the cost of
further improvements, additional precautions, increased recoveries, or
product liability insurance?
Where the financial burden is shared by an entire industry, no
problem appears to be presented, because even under highly competi-
tive conditions the industry as a whole can adjust its general price
level to reflect cost increases. A problem would appear to arise only
for a manufacturer whose particular product or method of operations
exposes him to risks not shared by others in the same highly com-
petitive industry. A possible example might be carbonated drinks in
glass, with its explosion hazard, as against carbonated drinks in tin,
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with no corresponding hazard. But even here, average costs of this
kind would seem to be relatively trivial as compared to cost incre-
ments such as wage increases. So far, there is nothing to indicate
that the imposition of strict liability has had an adverse effect on any
seller who has taken the precaution of covering the worst of his risks
with a deductible product liability policy. The big argument against
strict liability is that it increases the seller's exposure to fraud. How-
ever, I don't think that, on inspection, this argument holds water,
because what claimants have been faking is not the seller's fault but
causation, that is, the fact or the degree of injury.
Note that consumer protections are not necessarily expensive. One
of the most useful devices recently developed for protecting the con-
sumer, on the one hand, and taking the seller off the legal hook, on
the other, is the warning. One big retail chain, for example, has been
able to develop instructions for using its rotary power mowers that
have almost eliminated the possibility of recovery for certain risks,
particularly those based on design. (It may still be vulnerable, I
suppose, to occasional claims based on imperfect materials or in-
adequate assembly.) The warning is a relatively new concept in the
law and much still needs to to be done to define its proper scope,
limitations, and content in relation to particular risks. This is not
always easy, because telling the consumer too little, as in a recent
carbon tetrachloride case, may fail to discharge the responsibility.
whereas telling him too much may bury the essential message. Merely
telling him the ingredients may tell him almost nothing.
I am not going to take your time to describe the details of the
today's product liability coverage, which you can read about in the
Manual of Liability Insurance or the November 1960 revision of the
pertinent section of the Fire, Casualty and Surety Bulletin. I will
point out, however, that under current Manual rates your premium
for a given amount of protection will be articulated to the kinds of
risks to which your particular operation exposes you. The premium
range here is very wide.
It is more important for you to know that each product liability
policy carries a maximum dollar limit for each claim, another for each
accident, and a third for the entire policy period. Of these, probably
the most important limit is the insurer's maximum dollar obligation
for any one accident, since the injury of many persons from a single
cause is counted as one accident. This may be important if a slip-up
in your plant is likely to affect an entire batch of your product and
that batch can injure many persons. A bakery catering a large picnic,
for example, can infect a lot of picknickers with staphylococcus. Rais-
ing all three substantially won't necessarily be expensive, and you
may even want to fix your limit per accident as high as the limit for
the entire policy period.
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Another legal trend that helps to increase the manufacturer's lia-
bility risks is the tendency of the courts to cut down the protections
heretofore provided by disclaimer clauses. These have been used with
great advantage in the automobile industry, where they have been
upheld on the theory that the parties are free to contract as they will.
As one Federal court put it: "The buyer is under no compulsion to
buy from the seller; the buyer has a choice of accepting the seller's
terms or going elsewhere."
On the other hand, the Henningsen case, which I mentioned earlier,
indicates that this protection is losing some of its effectiveness. In
that case the Court struck down the standard industry-wide automobile
disclaimer on the ground that the buyer's "capacity for bargaining
is so unequal, the inexorable conclusion which follows is that he is
not permitted to bargain at all. He must take or leave the automobile
on the warranty terms dictated by the maker . . . Where can the
buyer go to negotiate for better protection?"
This has necessarily been a sketchy account, but it may serve to
indicate the general direction in which the law is moving and some
of the other reasons why manufacturers and other sellers have to be
on their guard as never before.
